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Abstract 
Preleasing of to-be-built commercial real estate space is a pervasive worldwide practice. 
Although such preleasing is an extensive and significant activity, it has not received adequate 
attention in the real estate economics and finance literature. Using an equilibrium micro-
economic agency model, this paper examines the economics of commercial real estate 
preleasing. The equilibrium prelease contract rent is a function of several variables, including the 
expected spot market rent, financing benefits from preleasing, developer-lessor and tenant-lessee 
risk-hedging behavior, the interplay between lessor and lessee default options, and the market 
capitalization rate. Our paper demonstrates how the distribution of risk preferences for lessees 
(and lessors) generates separating market equilibrium for the prelease and spot lease. We also 
consider the impacts of developer default and the lessee cancellation clause on the prelease rent 
equilibrium. 
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3  
Introduction 
 Commercial real estate preleasing, transacted via a lease contract between tenant (lessee) 
and landlord (lessor) that specifies a future rent and date when occupancy will commence, is a 
common international practice, often utilized for to-be-constructed commercial real estate.
1
 
Essentially a forward lease contract, preleasing provides benefits for the lessor and the lessee. It 
is frequently required by lenders and investors to ensure that a building will retain collateral 
market value in the event of builder default. Preleasing contracts are used for all types of 
commercial real estate, including office, industrial, and retail space.
2
 Although preleasing is an 
important and integral activity in the world of real estate, it has received relatively little attention 
in the academic literature. Our study is one of the first papers to address the theoretical 
determinants for preleasing economic equilibrium. 
 Preleasing arrangements for to-be-built real estate involve tradeoffs for lessees, lessor-
developers, and third-party capital sources (including construction and permanent lenders). By 
preleasing, the lessee satisfies future space use requirements, but also gains both an option and a 
hedge. Depending on the terms of the prelease agreement, the lessee may choose to default on 
occupancy if market rents in the future decline significantly, but the pre-lease simultaneously 
protects the lessee against market rental increases. On the other hand, the preleasing lessee faces 
a risk of non-performance by the lessor-developer (i.e., failure to deliver the building in a timely 
fashion). By arranging for future tenancy before the completion of the building, the developer 
creates a guaranteed level of cash flow for the real estate project. Abstracting from lessee default, 
                                                          
1
 Our paper focuses on preleasing for to-be-built (new) commercial real estate projects. The analysis is applicable, 
with relatively simple modifications, to other commercial preleasing arrangements for existing properties as well as 
lease renewal options. 
2
 Although they are popular in retail development, prelease contracts for anchor tenants such as department stores 
frequently contain significant rent discounts because (1) the anchors bring positive externality to the shopping center 
and (2) anchor tenants simplify and enhance the renting of space to other tenants. For detailed review of the role of 
the anchor tenant in the retail real estate setting, please refer to Liu and Liu (2013). 
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the prelease contract would in principle be risk-reducing for the developer and the lender and 
provide the developer with access to capital on terms and conditions that either would not be 
otherwise available or would be more costly. Lenders frequently require some preleasing for 
properties before they are willing to deliver loan proceeds. Prelease conditions may be specified 
in loan covenants. If prelease requirements are not satisfied, the lender may seek remedies such 
as requiring the loan to be re-margined, vacating the loan in favor of a stand-by take-out loan, or 
rescinding the loan offer. 
 In summary, preleasing can reduce lessee search risks and costs, provide a lessee default 
option, and hedge against unanticipated future market rent increases. From the landlord-
investor’s point of view, preleasing reduces cash flow risk. Finally, the debt lender will use 
preleasing conditions to reduce the risks of lending. Of course, the various risks of default 
complicate preleasing for all three parties. In particular, the lessee may not be able or willing to 
take possession. On the other hand, the developer may be unable to perform, causing lessee 
occupancy disruption as well as adversely affecting the lender’s position. 
 In the next section of the paper, we provide a selective review of the related literature. In 
subsequent sections, we develop a theoretical framework for preleasing economic equilibrium 
for understanding the economic incentives and optimizing behavior for lessees, owner-
developer-investors, and lenders. We examine how the interlinked preleasing options for lessees 
and lessor-developers affect commercial real estate market outcomes. Our model provides 
insights into the conditions that generate a separating equilibrium for the existence of preleasing 
and “spot” leasing. 
  
5  
Research Context: Selected Literature 
 The existing finance and real estate literature about real asset leasing is extensive. In 
finance, the vast majority of leasing research focuses on the role of taxation in determining the 
choice between leasing and owning real assets. Virtually any standard finance and investment 
textbook analyzes the lease-own decision using a discounted cash flow model as well as an 
attendant analysis relating to the complex options associated with real asset user choices. 
Redman and Tanner (2001), using corporate real estate executive surveys, provide information 
about the real estate leasing versus ownership decision-making process. In their analysis, they 
identify various motives and techniques for leasing and ownership of real estate assets. 
 The real estate finance and economics literature offers a relatively large set of empirical 
studies that emphasize the determinants of rental rates for commercial real estate as well as the 
adjustment dynamics for rental and vacancy rates. In general, the joint adjustment between rents 
and vacancy are found to be functions of the macroeconomic environment, the local employment 
market, and the commercial real estate supply, including new development. The classic article by 
Wheaton et al. (1997) is an excellent source for exploring the relationship between rents, 
vacancy rates, and the interplay of local employment rates. Sivitanidou (2002), among many 
others, stresses the importance of taking into account spatial variation in supply and demand and 
other idiosyncratic market characteristics for specifying the rental market. Her analysis focuses 
on the adjustment towards equilibrium, which in many markets may be gradual, suggesting that 
prevailing rents may deviate from implicit long-run equilibrium levels for sustained periods of 
time. She concludes that ignoring the sluggish rental adjustment process may produce misleading 
inferences about the determinants of long-run equilibrium values for rents and vacancy rates. 
These econometric analyses usually evaluate the rental-vacancy adjustment process at the MSA 
6  
level, and are macro in nature; and do not explicitly focus upon the details of the lessee-lessor 
rental interactive process. 
 A small but burgeoning literature emphasizing the micro-organization of real estate 
markets has emerged for explaining the linkages between the lessor and the lessee for 
determining lease rates and market values. Papers in this stream of the literature are more closely 
related to our research. Deng and Liu (2009) summarizes the impacts of presale or forward 
market on real estate transaction and financing in China. They conclude that presale transactions 
present a significant risk in Chinese real estate market, especially in economic downturn. Wong 
et al. (2007) focus on the interrelationship between the real estate spot and forward markets for 
residential sales for the Hong Kong housing market. They find that the forward and spot markets 
are interrelated, as would be expected, with economic shocks in the forward market being 
transmitted to the spot market. Edelstein et al. (2012) and Chan et al. (2012) are among the 
recent studies that focus on the theoretical underpinning of the presale market. Mooradian and 
Yang (2002) devise a theoretical commercial real estate model with asymmetric information 
between tenants and landlords. In their analysis, depending upon the nature of the asymmetric 
information, the tenant and landlord negotiate gross versus net leases. 
 The three papers that are most similar to ours include two by Grenadier (1995, 2005) and 
one by Buttimer and Ott (2007). Grenadier (1995), using a real option approach, characterizes 
commercial development with stochastic lease rates and occupancy. In his model, the 
commercial property owner leases vacant space at a rental rate that is determined by a stochastic 
downward-sloping lessee demand curve. Tenants are always available, but because of the 
downward-sloping demand, lessors may not choose to offer vacant units. The demand lease rate 
is stochastic, and there is a lease rate that will trigger a change in vacancy for individual 
7  
buildings. Lease rates also determine individual property development decisions, but only upon 
completion of the building will the owners rent the optimal amount of space based on demand. 
Grenadier (2005) modifies his earlier analysis to include, among other things, the possibility of 
preleasing. The Grenadier models are driven primarily by the aforementioned assumption of the 
downward-sloping stochastic lease demand faced by the individual property developer-lessor. 
 Buttimer and Ott (2007) develop a leasing occupancy commercial real estate model that 
is in many ways similar to that of Grenadier, but differs insofar as the model assumes that the 
market is competitive and lessors are price takers. Uncertain lessee demand enters the model 
through a search framework, whereby the frequency of tenant arrivals and ability to pay are key 
mechanisms for clearing the market. Depending on the exact nature of tenant arrivals and the 
distribution of the ability to pay rent, Buttimer and Ott permit preleasing to occur, and the 
developer may thereby hedge the risks of leasing rental rates and vacancies. 
 Micro-leasing market papers generally utilize a real options approach to determine 
leasing market implications. The underlying workings of the economic actors are implicit, 
essentially taking the form of a black box. In the Grenadier models, the downward-sloping 
stochastic demand curve is the key to the developer decision-making process. In the Buttimer 
and Ott analysis, however, the price-taking nature of the developer is the crucial assumption. In 
this paper, we employ a utility-maximization economic model in which the developer and 
tenants determine an equilibrium between the preleasing and spot leasing markets. The choices 
between leasing in the spot market and preleasing are determined by the interaction of the 
preferences of the tenants and developers. By using our micro-economic lessor and lessee 
framework, we can derive an explicit equilibrium for preleasing activity and lease rates as well 
as the conditions for generating a well-defined separating equilibrium. 
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The Model Setup and Principles for Equilibrium Pricing 
 In our model, the commercial real estate developer faces rent uncertainty for to-be-built 
space. The model has one period with two dates: a prelease date, t=0, and the completion date, 
t=1. We assume that the commercial real estate lease rate (rent per square foot) at t=1 follows a 
normal distribution: 
                                                                                            
where   is the expected rent,   is a random variable unknown to lessees and is normally 
distributed with mean equal to zero and volatility of  . 
 There are two types of economic agents: a quasi-monopolist developer (lessor) and many 
lessees (tenants) who require space for business operations. We assume that the lessees and the 
developer-lessor are risk-averse with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility.
3
 (A risk-
neutral lessee and a risk-neutral lessor-developer are special cases that are discussed in Section 
4.1.) 
 Endowed with a permit to develop a commercial real estate property, the developer 
commences building at t=0 and completes construction for occupancy at t=1.
4
 The developer 
finances the project with a construction loan, which requires that a portion of the to-be-built 
space be preleased before the construction is completed. The remaining space in the building will 
be leased at t=1 at the prevailing spot market rent, which is determined, in turn, by the supply of 
and demand for space on the lease spot markets.
5
The developer is the lessor during the 
construction period. Figure 1 outlines the timeline for both the lessor-developer and the lessees. 
                                                          
3
 Although CARA utility does not contain a wealth effect, the main insights for our analyses do not depend on the 
choice of the particular utility function. It can be shown that the same results obtain if we model the maximization of 
consumer surplus. Another form of utility function frequently used is Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), 
which engenders similar results. 
4
 The scale of the development is pre-determined. 
5
 The spot market rent is treated as an effective rent that takes vacancy into consideration. 
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The Lessees 
 Tenants are naturally heterogeneous along a number of dimensions, such as business 
operation, market power, and space requirements. For analytical tractability, we assume that the 
tenant characteristics are summarized in the risk-aversion parameter. Following Dumas 
(1989),Wang (1996), and Chan and Kogan (2002), we model the heterogeneity of the lessee’s 
risk aversion explicitly: There exists a continuum of tenants        , with CARA utility 
indexed for lessee   using   . Each lessee minimizes the loss of expected utility caused by rental 
expenditures by either prelease (j=0) or spot lease (j=1) contracts. 
   
     
         
 
                                                          
The Lessor-Developer 
 As a local monopoly, the developer can determine the prelease rents for the new 
development project. However, upon completion of her development, the spot rent will be 
determined by the local space market. The total number of units to be developed is assumed to be 
nonrandom.
6
 Assuming for convenience that the developer finances the project with a 
construction loan maturing at T=1, the total investment cost is I and the loan amount is M. The 
interest rates are   , and    for prelease and spot lease projects, respectively. Because preleases 
secure future cash flows, the developer obtains more favorable financing terms with a lower 
interest rate for the project by preleasing some space (i.e., where      ). 
 Upon completion, the developer either sells the building to an investor or becomes the 
owner-lessor.
7
 The developer’s net profit (X) equals the capitalized rents less the total costs of 
                                                          
6
 If the quantities of production are allowed to vary, along with the scale of forward hedging, the results remain 
unchanged. As established by Feder et al. (1980), in the presence of the forward market a complete separation is 
maintained between the production decision and the hedging (forward-selling) decision. Edelstein et al. (2012) also 
find that pre-committed sales do not affect a developer’s production decision. 
7
 A commercial lease usually contains non-disturbance and lease assignment clauses, which require that tenants 
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development, which are computed as a periodic lease rate (  ) divided by a market capitalization 
rate (   ), minus the total costs of investment (I) and the financing cost (   )). 
   
  
   
                                                                             
 Assume that the developer maximizes the utility of profit at the building completion date. 
If the developer’s utility function is CARA over    with risk-aversion parameter (g), the 
developer’s expected utility of profits from an average lessee can be expressed as the weighted 
average of expected utilities of profits from prelease contracts and spot market lease contracts: 
   
  
 
         
                         
                                                     
where      , and        represent the market demand for preleases and spot leases, 
respectively.  
 
The Basic Principles for Equilibrium Pricing 
 The market equilibrium will produce two important results: 1) the market-clearing rent 
for the prelease contract and 2) the scale of prelease demand. 
 The strategy for solving this equilibrium model involves jointly maximizing the utilities 
for lessees and developers. We assume there exists an optimal prelease rent and then calibrate the 
equilibrium market-clearing rent that maximizes the developer utility function. In the first step, 
we solve the lessee’s maximization problem assuming the spot rent and the prelease rent are 
given. Since there is a continuum of heterogeneous lessees, the marginal lessee, who is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
continue to occupy the building and pay the rents irrespective of changes in ownership. 
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indifferent between renting the space on the spot market or the prelease market, determines 
rental market equilibrium. The critical level of risk-aversion,   , is a function of the optimal rent 
for preleases, and divides to-be-developed commercial space into two tiers: the prelease market 
(  ) and the spot market (  ). Specifically, if a given lessee is more risk-adverse than the 
marginal lessee is, she will choose to rent the space via the prelease market, and vice versa. 
Therefore, the lessee’s renting decision rule can be summarized as: 
 A.  Rent the space on the prelease market if     
 or                      
 B.  Rent the space on the spot market if     
 or                      
 C.  Be indifferent between the prelease or spot market lease if     
 or  
                       
 We further assume that the distribution of lessee risk aversion is exponential,
8
 with a 
mean risk aversion of 1/λ. 
        
             
         
                                                                     
 Figure 2 displays the scale of demand for prelease and spot real estate transactions. The 
market demand for a prelease contract is     
 
. That is, the proportion of    =  
     lessees will 
choose renting via a prelease contract at T= 0. Similarly, the proportion of spot market 
commercial space will be    =    
    . 
 In the second step, we derive the endogenous equilibrium for the market rent for 
preleases. The developer decides at T=0 what portion of the space is to be preleased and how 
much is to be charged for the prelease. The equilibrium rent for the prelease is determined by 
maximizing the expected utility of profit from the prelease and spot lease. The lessor- 
developer’s control variable is the prelease rental rates. With the scale of demand for the prelease 
                                                          
8
 Explicitly introducing lessee risk heterogeneity makes the scale of the market equilibrium demand for prelease 
contracts endogenous. 
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and spot markets solved in the first step, the developer’s maximization problem determines the 
“market price” for prelease contracts. Since the market scale is a function of the prelease rent, the 
monopoly developer balances the tradeoff from income generated by preleases and spot market 
rentals.  
 
The Basic Model Without Lessor Default or a Lessee Cancellation Clause 
 As a benchmark scenario, we assume the lessor and the lessees will fulfill the lease 
contract. That is, the lessees will not terminate the preleases, and the developer will complete the 
project and deliver space on time for the tenants. To gain a graduated understanding of the 
impact of default on prelease behavior, we consider developer default in Section 5 and tenant 
cancellation in Section 6. 
 Let   
      and   
      be tenant i's (dis)utility functions derived from rental expenditure 
for the prelease and spot lease, respectively. 
   
      
 
                                                                                 
    
        
 
                 
 
           
 
 
  
                   
 
 The “marginal lessee,”   , is indifferent between renting space through the spot or 
prelease markets; she would derive the same utility from either the prelease transaction or the 
spot market lease. Equating Eqs. (6) and (7) yields the following: 
       
       
  
                                                                                  
 The critical value of a lessee’s risk aversion is an increasing function of the prelease rent, 
as shown in Eq. (9). This equation implies that the demand share from lessee preleases,   , is 
13  
decreasing when the equilibrium prelease rent increases. Equation (8) further indicates that the 
demand-rent sensitivity is an inverse function of rental market risk (i.e., rent volatility). 
   
   
 
 
  
                                                                                                     
 The lesser-developer’s combined expected utility of profits from the prelease and spot 
lease markets will be:  
          
 
       
   
   
                 
                    
   
   
 
                    
                                                                                        (10) 
 The first-order condition for the developer’s optimal leasing strategy is 
      
   
   
        
   
   
 
 
   
       
  
   
 
    
     
        
   
   
               
 From Eqs. (8) and (9), the equilibrium prelease rent for the developer can be derived and 
expressed in the following equation: 
  
             
   
    
 
   
 
      
   
     
                                
 From Eq. (12), the market equilibrium rent for one unit of commercial space in the 
prelease market,   , is jointly determined by: 
(1) Expected market average rent    
  
  is a positive linear function of  . Higher average market rents induce higher prelease 
rents. 
(2) (2) Financing benefit from preleases     . 
 Since the developer is assumed to be able to obtain a lower interest rate for 
construction financing for preleased space, she is willing to provide a rent discount to 
lessees who sign preleases. Larger financing benefits,     , create lower prelease rents. 
(3) Developer-lessor risk-hedging discount  
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 If the developer-lessor is risk-averse, she is willing to hedge future rental market 
risk by providing a rent discount to lessees who choose to sign prelease contracts. Higher 
levels of developer risk aversion ( ) and greater levels of market risk (  ) generate lower 
prelease rents. 
(4) Lessee risk-hedging premium 
   
 
      
   
     
  . 
 If lessees are more risk-averse on average than the lessors are, they will wish to 
secure space in the newly-developed building by signing preleases. Higher average lessee 
risk aversion (
 
 
) or larger market rental risk (  ) will raise the prelease rental rate. 
Other factors that influence the market equilibrium preleasing rents include but are not 
limit to the following: 
(5) The capitalization rate (Cap). 
 The market capitalization rate transforms the value of risk hedging and financing 
benefit into cash flows (rents). Because the Cap influences three terms in Eq. (12), the 
impact of the cap rate on the equilibrium prelease rent is non-monotonic. 
(6) Macro-economic factors. 
 Other macro-economic factors also play important roles in determining the 
equilibrium rents. In our model, those factors reflect overall economic conditions and 
influence the preleasing activities through the channel of the interest rate (r), and rental 
volatility (σ). 
  The market share for prelease demand is 
      
   
     
 
 
     
   
    
  
   
 
        
  
            
 
 
The Special Cases of Risk-Neutral Lessees and a Risk-Neutral Lessor 
 In our model to this point, we have assumed that the lessees and the lessor are risk-
averse. The optimal prelease rent, determined by Eq. (12), depends on the distribution of risk 
aversion among the lessees and the lessor, among other factors. What if at least one of the 
15  
contracting counterparties is risk-neutral? What if both are? We now discuss scenarios involving 
risk-neutral agents as special cases. 
 
Risk-neutral lessees: Taking the limit with the average risk-aversion parameter (   ) to zero, Eq. 
(12) will determine the optimal prelease rent with a risk-neutral lessee: 
  
             
   
    
                                                            
 Since the developer is concerned about the future vacancy, she will offer preleasing 
discounts to risk-neutral tenants in order to guarantee future cash flows. In this case, all lessees 
will prelease, that is       
 
Risk-neutral lessor: Taking the limit in Eq. (12) with the developer risk-aversion parameter g 
tending to zero creates the optimal prelease rent in Eq. (15): 
  
             
  
  
                                                                 
 The equilibrium prelease rent for the risk-neutral lessor is greater than the rent would be 
if the lessor were risk-averse, because the lessor risk-hedging discount vanishes (compare Eqs. 
(12) with (15)). Under this scenario, the lessees would be willing to pay a premium to hedge 
against any future real estate rental-rate risk. The market demand for preleases is reduced 
to                  
      
 
Risk-neutral lessees and risk-neutral lessor: Combining risk-neutral lessees with the risk-neutral 
lessor yields the following optimal prelease rent: 
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 The equilibrium prelease rent when both lessees and the lessor-developer are risk-neutral 
contains only two components. Without hedging demand, the value of prelease cash flow is 
equal to the capitalized future expected rents minus the financing benefit the developer enjoys 
through the use of preleases. Again in this case, all lessees will prelease the commercial space, 
that is    . 
 
The Equilibrium Prelease Rent and Market Risk 
 The equilibrium lease-risk function for the commercial real estate prelease rent varies 
with levels of risk aversion associated with lessees and the developer-lessor. To understand the 
rent-risk relationship in the prelease market, we simulate the rental market dynamics with the 
base rent of $10 per square foot and cap rate of 10 % (unless otherwise specified). The three 
panels in Fig. 3 highlight three comparative statics analyses. As shown in Fig. 3, when rental 
market risk increases, the prelease rent varies directly with the relationship of the lessees’ risk 
aversion to that of the developer. The prerelease rent is greater than the expected future spot rent 
if the average lessee’s risk aversion is greater than that of the lessor-developer. The above pattern 
is not surprising, because the prelease rent will reflect the fact that risk-adverse lessees are 
typically willing to “insure” against the future rental risk. The converse is true if the lessor is 
more risk-averse and willing to hedge her risk by providing a prelease discount. 
 As shown in Eq. (12), the equilibrium prelease rent is a non-monotonic function of 
commercial leasing risk   . When lessees are more risk-averse than the developer-lessor, 
i.e.,       , the optimal prelease price   
  is a concave function of rental risk   . The 
maximum optimal prelease rental rate is achieved when the volatility of the real estate leasing 
rates satisfies the condition in Eq. (17): 
17  
    
            
  
                                                                         
 The corresponding prelease rental rate is generated by Eq  
     
             
   
 
     
   
  
                                          
 The market capitalization rate plays an important role in equilibrium prelease pricing by 
linking real estate space market equilibrium cash flow to the real estate asset market valuation. 
As shown in Fig. 4, which assumes that the lessor and the lessees have equivalent levels of risk 
aversion, the equilibrium prelease rent increases monotonically with the cap rate, because higher 
cap rates translate into lower market asset values. The wedge of prelease rents between the high 
cap rate and the low cap rate is larger when rental market risk is larger, because the lessor-
developer needs to set a higher risk premium for the prelease rent to compensate for increased 
risk. 
 Assuming the lessor and the lessees have equivalent levels of risk aversion, the financing 
benefit from the preleases include a lower interest rate, or a higher loan-to-value ratios (thus a 
larger loan amount), or both. As shown in Fig. 5, and as would be expected, the greater the 
financing benefit, the lower the equilibrium prelease rent. 
 
Effects of Developer-Lessor Default 
 The base case analysis highlights the impact of risk-hedging behavior on the part of the 
lessees and the lessor-developer, and the financing benefits created by prelease contracts. In 
reality, the developer may not be able to deliver the preleased premises on time. Developer 
default can occur because of insufficient construction capital, (a common occurrence during the 
recent financial crisis of 2008–2009 in the U.S.), unexpected increases in construction costs, 
18  
harsh weather, or other unforeseen circumstances that dramatically change the market 
environment. As discussed earlier, preleasing affects project financing, which in turn determines 
the feasibility of a project. The developer may choose to default if preleasing was not successful. 
We, however, do not consider the developer default from this reason in our model, because a 
monopolistic developer can always obtain prelease tenants by reducing prelease rents.
9
 
(Moreover the preleasing market is likely to break down due to moral hazard issues, if the 
lessees know that the landlord will strategically default.) 
 Of course, developer default may have significant impacts on preleased tenancy to the 
extent that it interrupts the planned move-in and business operation at the new site. In some 
circumstances, the lessees will be forced to search for alternative space on the spot leasing 
market at the planned move-in date. The lessee’s inconvenience and costs caused by a possible 
lessor default should be incorporated into the equilibrium prelease rent contract. In this section, 
we explicitly consider developer-lessor default. 
 We assume that the developer’s failure to deliver the real estate space at the planned 
move-in date,    , is exogenous. Let the default probability of the monopoly developer be p. 
The financial loss incurred by the lessee due to developer default is assumed to be a linear 
portion of the prelease rent,     10 
 For a prelease lessee, the total rental expenditures will be        if the developer 
defaults, and    if the developer does not default. Therefore, the prelease lessee i’s utility 
function is modified to form Eq. (19): 
     
 
                                                                     
                                                          
9
 Assuming that the developer or the local real estate development authority has done a thorough feasibility 
analysis before the development permit was issued; we should not expect a sudden shift in space market demand. 
10
 For expositional simplicity, we assume that lessee transaction and search costs caused by the lessor default are nil 
and that there are no litigation actions. 
19  
 Equating the expected utility of a prelease contract, Eq. (19), with the expected utility of 
the spot market lease, Eq. (7), we derive the critical level for lessee risk aversion for market 
equilibrium with exogenous developer default: 
   
          
  
                 
   
   
                                    
 The optimal prelease rent can be solved by maximizing the developer’s utility of profits. 
  
             
   
    
 
   
 
      
   
      
                          
  where                   
   
   
 
 When there is no default risk (   ) or there is no measurable financial loss caused by 
the developer default (   ), k vanishes and the critical level of risk aversion and optimal 
prelease rent revert to those in the base case. Furthermore, k increases as the developer-default 
probability increases or the financial loss conditional upon default increases. Therefore we can 
regard the parameter   (   ) as the developer default impact parameter. 
 Equation (20) implied that a higher default impact   will lead to a reduced prelease 
demand,   . 
   
       
   
                                                                          
 This outcome is caused by the lessee’s being reluctant to prelease in the light of 
developer default risk. Equation (21) implies that a higher default impact k will lead to a 
decreased equilibrium prelease rent   . The lessee’s hedging premium is reduced when she faces 
a developer default risk. 
 Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the developer default probability upon the equilibrium 
rent-risk relationship, while Fig. 7 demonstrates the impact of the lessee loss, conditional upon 
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developer default, on the equilibrium rent-risk relationship. Figures 6 and 7 illustrates the results 
from Eq. (23); the higher the likelihood of developer default or the greater the lessee loss, 
conditional upon default, the lower will be the equilibrium prelease rent. 
 
Effects of a Lessee’s Prelease Cancellation Clause 
 A prelease contract with a tenant cancellation clause creates added flexibility for the 
lessee by creating an option for non-occupancy, and simultaneously protects the lessee from 
market rent increases in the new building. Mooradian and Yang (2002) analyze the importance 
of the tenant cancellation strategy in the corporate real estate leasing decision. By including a 
lessee cancellation clause in the prelease contract, the lessor is essentially issuing a put option. 
 If the prelease contract requires a cash deposit (   ) to obtain the right (but not the 
obligation) to rent the commercial real estate space in the future, the prelease lessee can “walk 
away” by forfeiting the deposit (the option premium) for any reason, including if the future 
market rent    decreases sufficiently.
11
 When the lessee decides to exercise the cancellation  
 The optimal exercise of the cancellation clause occurs when           ; In that 
instance, the lessee will exercise the cancellation option and the lessor loses the prelease rent 
commitment. When            , the cancellation option will not be exercised and the 
lessees will honor the prelease contract (ceteris paribus). The tenant’s utility with the prelease 
cancellation option is equal to or greater than that of the base case. 
  
           
         
                                                                   
                                                          
11
 There are certainly other reasons that a tenant does not honor the prelease contract such as tenant default or down-
sizing, or alternative location choice, etc. On the other hand, there may some hidden costs of cancellation for the 
lessees. Therefore the proportional loss α should be interpreted as an effective economic threshold for exercising the 
cancellation clause. 
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 The critical value of risk aversion becomes
12
 
   
    
      
  
                                                                   
          
              
     
       
       
   
 
 
 Clearly, offering a prelease cancellation option increases prelease demand and decreases 
the critical value for risk aversion vis-à-vis that of the base case. 
 The equilibrium prelease rent should implicitly price the lessee cancellation option. The 
developer maximizes the following expected utility from the combined prelease and spot lease 
markets: 
           
 
       
   
   
                    
          
      
   
                         
  
          
  
   
                      
          
                                                                                                                                                         
where        is an indicator function         
                       
                       
   
 Equation (26) shows that when the spot market rent at T = 1 is significantly lower than 
the prelease rent, lessees who have signed a prelease contract will forfeit the deposit by walking 
away from the commitment and rent space in the spot market . The equilibrium prelease rent is 
solved by the developer’s maximization Eq. (27): 
  
        
  
 
 
 
 
     
 
       
   
   
                    
     
   
      
    
     
              
        
 
   
      
 
   
  
   
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Note that G is a function of  . Therefore Eq. (25) is an implicit definition of  . 
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where   , and   are functions of   .                                                                                             
 The cancellation option scenario does not have a closed-form solution. We therefore 
employ numerical methods to deduce implications. Following the same frameworks as in Figs. 3, 
4 and 5, the three panels in Figs. 8, 9 and 10 display the prelease function for various commercial 
real estate leasing market variables. It is not surprising that the equilibrium values for the 
prelease rent with the tenant cancellation option are higher than are those of the base case, 
because the lessor has to be compensated for the increased risk of adverse rent movements. 
 Figure 8 compares three prelease rent curves with different pairs of values for risk-
aversion for lessor and lessee. In contrast to Fig. 3, the prelease rent increases with market 
volatility under these three scenarios of lessee-lessor risk-aversion relationships. Because the 
cancellation option is considered as part of the prelease rent in equilibrium, higher expected 
rental market risk will result in higher prelease rents. The prelease rent is higher when lessees are 
more risk-averse than the lessor because the prelease rent includes an additional risk premium 
created by the cancellation clause. Figure 9 illustrates the prelease rent function for a range of 
capitalization rates. Figure 10 shows the prelease rent function for varying levels of financing 
benefits. If the developer-lessor attains a greater financing benefit by preleasing, she is willing to 
secure lower prelease rents. However, the prelease rents are still higher than the expected spot 
market rent. If the financing benefit is sufficiently large (for example, there is a 10 % financing 
benefit), the developer-lessor could charge zero premium, because the value of financing benefit 
has well offset the cost of writing an option to the lessees. 
 
Conclusion 
 Research on commercial real estate has been accelerated due to the availability of 
23  
commercial databases such as Real Capital Analytics (e.g., Plazzi et al. 2010) and CoStar (e.g., 
Gatzlaff and Liu 2013). Commercial real estate preleasing is a common international practice, 
surprisingly few studies have investigated the economics of preleasing. This study has examined 
preleasing contracts for to-be-built commercial real estate, using a set of equilibrium micro-
economic agency models. The key analysis focuses on the lessee’s desire to hedge future rent 
increases while also creating an option for non-occupancy in the future, the lessor’s desire to 
hedge against future rent declines, and the generation of an option for default—non-delivery of 
the premises to tenants in a timely fashion. 
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Figure 1. The timeline in the economy 
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Figure 2. The market demand for commercial real estate prelease 
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Figure 3. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different risk aversion levels of lessees and lessor. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap 
rate=10 %, no-default 
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Figure 4. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different cap rates. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between 
average lessee and lessor, no default 
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Figure 5. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different developer financing benefits. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-
aversion level between average lessee and lessor, cap rate=10 %, no-default 
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Figure 6. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different developer default probability. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10 %, 
equivalent risk-aversion level between average lessee and lessor, loss given default=0.5 
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Figure 7. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different loss rates given default. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap rate=10 %, 
equivalent risk-aversion level between average lessee and lessor, developer default 
probability=0.5 
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Figure 8. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different risk aversion levels of lessees and lessor. Other parameters: average rent=10, cap 
rate=10 %, considering the Lessee’s Cancellation Clause 
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Figure 9. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different cap rates. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-aversion level between 
average lessee and lessor, considering the Lessee’s Cancellation Clause 
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Figure 10. Commercial real estate leasing market risks and equilibrium rent of prelease contract 
by different developer financing benefits. Other parameters: average rent=10, equivalent risk-
aversion level between average lessee and lessor, cap rate=10 %, considering the Lessee’s 
Cancellation Clause 
 
